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Abstract
This lecture not only shows how game theory can contribute to the detection 
of collusion and predation, but also how experts for the defense can use 
game-theoretic arguments to make such detection difficult. A few important 
European anti-trust cases are discussed to illustrate.
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Let me start with a quotation from the Bible: "And Moses went down 
from the mount unto the people, and sanctified the people; and they washed 
their clothes. And he said unto the people, "Be ready against the third day: 
come not at your wives".
This quotation seems appropriate, not because this congress is lasting 
three days, but because - like Moses - 1 shall come down from the mountain 
and bring you the tables with the commandments. This will be my gift to 
those of you who are or will be involved in the implementation of 
competition policy at the European or national level. If those working for 
the defense, the so-called expert witnesses, obey the ten commandments, they 
will make the detection of collusion even more difficult than it is today. Yet, 
if the antitrust authorities know the ten rules of the game the defense is 
playing, they will react better than they currently do and increase their 
chances of detecting collusion.
In plain words, my topic is about how game theory can help collusion 
detection and especially about how game theory can help in making collusion 
detection difficult. Indeed, since we, the economic experts, are more often 
than not paid to testify for the defense, I shall pay special attention to the 
arguments they need to make their case.
It should be clear, therefore, that I shall disappoint those of you who 
expected me to enumerate all the weaknesses of the current use or misuse of 
game theory in industrial economics, as well as those of you who thought I 
would give my views on how competition policy ought to be conceived in the 
light of current developments of microeconomic theory. I shall resist the 



























































































issues. I shall resist the second temptation, because as a fully trained lawyer 
I must take the legal framework within which competition policy is 
operating in Europe as given. This view may seem old-fashioned in view of 
the current legal doctrine, but I am too old to change my legal instincts.
So let me start by briefly reminding you of this legal framework as 
formulated in Article 85 and Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome and in most 
national legislations (which are, today, directly inspired by these articles).
First of all, cartels, price agreements and market separating 
agreements are illegal and therefore not enforceable. I call these examples 
of explicit collusion.
Second, tacit collusion is also illegal. Tacit collusion refers to 
collusive outcomes that are sustained as equilibria of a noncooperative 
repeated game. Article 85 calls these "concerted practices", that is, collusive 
outcomes based on a "concordance of wills" in the absence of explicit 
agreements. There may have been pre-play communication, but certainly no 
communication during the play. This, I understand, distinguishes European 
competition policy from US antitrust law.
Third, according to Article 86, the abuse of a dominant position, not 
the dominant position as such, is illegal. The abuse can take any form.
A few general comments seem to be in order at this point. In this 
legal framework, antitrust authorities are not social planners. The objective 
of European competition policy cannot be construed as getting price down to 
marginal cost or maximising social welfare. So the theorems of welfare 
economics are not to be applied per se. (Please interpret this as a statement 




























































































Also note that I defined tacit collusion in terms of market outcomes 
rather than conduct. I suspect that antitrust lawyers may have difficulties 
with this, given that they are used to trying to give proof of anticompetitive 
behaviour. Their hesitations may also be due to the fact that economics, and 
especially game theory, comes in when one has to define and measure market 
outcomes.
Finally, let me mention that cartel laws, such as the ones just 
described, are good not only for consumers but also for business, as Selten 
(1984) has shown. The intuition behind this result is that collusive profits 
are likely to attract new entry. When collusion is effectively prevented by 
cartel laws, there are fewer competitors around. More precisely, the 
maximal number of entrants compatible with non-negative noncollusive 
Cournot profits is smaller than the number of entrants in a collusive game. 
As a consequence, the expected sum of all profits in an industry and the 
expected profit per producer is larger when cartel laws are enforced.
A natural way to proceed is to discuss first the enforcement of Article 
85, with special emphasis on the detection of tacit collusion since that is the 
main problem antitrust authorities are facing today, and then to consider the 
detection of abuses of dominant positions.
II. Enforcement of Article 85
2.1. Explicit Collusion
In the early days, some 30 years ago, the first task of DG IV, the 
Directorate General of the Commission in charge of competition policy, was 




























































































markets in which competitors are "few". The reason was a simple one - and 
a wrong one: the more competitors there are, the more difficult it is to 
agree. In addition, nobody knew what "few" meant. Today we know how 
many "few" are. Selten (1973) gave the answer, an amazingly precise one: 
"4 are few and 6 are many". If there are 4 or less competitors, the 
probability of finding a cartel is 1. If there are 5, the probability that all 5 
will collude is 0.221. If there are more than 5, this probability is 1% or 
less.
Why is this? Because if there are less than 5 competitors in a market, 
they will all find it profitable to collude. If there are more than 5, it 
becomes more advantageous to stay out of a cartel formed by others, that is, 
the position of an outsider becomes relatively more attractive as the number 
of competitors increases.
The argument hinges on the number of firms that find it profitable to 
stay out of a collusive agreement. Let k be this number and let n be the 
number of competitors in a market. Let these n players play a 3-stage game 
in which they decide to participate in a collusive agreement or not in the first 
stage. In the second stage, those who decided to participate agree on a quota 
cartel, and finally all decide how much to supply in a third Cournot 
subgame.
Up to n = 4, for all of them to participate, or k = 0, is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. When there are more than 4 firms, cartel equilibria 
with less than n firms participating can be found. However, if the number 
of non-participants is k > ( n - 1)/2, then every player receives the 
unrestricted Coumot-Nash equilibrium profit. In other words, it then 




























































































like the non-participators. So, for a cartel to be effective, we must have 
k < ( n - 1)/2. This means that in a market with 5 or 6 competitors, an 
effective cartel has 4 members. With 7 or 8 competitors, the cartel will have 
5 members, and so on.
How general is this result? I think it is quite general. The assumptions 
made, such as linearity and symmetry, are simplifying assumptions and are 
not really restrictive. The only potential problem is that, in Selten's game, 
the players have complete information. Is it still true that "4 is few and 6 
are many" when firms have private information about their costs and are not 
symmetric? The surprising answer is: yes! Truthful cost reporting, that is, 
incentive compatibility, combined with efficiency is enforceable only up to 
n = 4. This is the important result obtained by Cramton and Palfrey (1990).
2.2. Tacit Collusion
When the legal advisors of cartel members discovered that Article 85 
had to be taken seriously, they had their clients throw their agreements in the 
waste basket. Simultaneously, the attention of DG IV shifted to the detection 
of tacit collusion, on the assumption that explicit collusion was being 
replaced by tacit collusion. Inevitably, DG IV began to discover the ubiquity 
of oligopolistic situations, characterised by strategic interdependence, and the 
irrelevance of the pure competition model.
A theory of oligopoly was needed. However, in the absence of a well 
developed game-theoretic approach in the sixties, all microeconomic theory 
had to offer was what I would call the Stigler approach. George Stigler's 
1964 paper on "A Theory of Oligopoly" indeed provided the dominant 




























































































game-theoretic jargon, it appears as a model in which oligopolists play a 
"one-shot game" with two strategies: either cooperate to fix prices or deviate 
by cheating. In Jonathan Baker's (1993, p. 151) words:
"Indeed, the unilateral incentive to deviate on a cooperative 
arrangement to fix price, highlighted by Stigler, is the very market 
force by which competition insures low prices and high output to the 
benefit of consumers and the economy".
To put it sharply, cheating became synonymous with competitive behaviour. 
Anything that makes it difficult for an individual firm to cheat, such as 
information sharing or actual punishments, was used as proof of tacit 
collusion. In fact, antitrust authorities spent a lot of time trying to collect 
evidence of direct communication between competitors, threats of 
punishment or actual punishments of deviators.
The difficulty with this approach is that, when no cheating and 
therefore no punishment is observed, there is no way to distinguish tacit 
collusion from strategic interdependence. The concept of a noncooperative 
Nash equilibrium, from which nobody wishes to deviate, but in which a 
collusive as well as a noncollusive outcome can be sustained, was missing. 
To construe the absence of cheating as evidence of tacit collusion is no 
longer acceptable.
Today's insights derived from the theory of repeated games, initiated 
by Jim Friedman in 1971 and further developed as different versions of the 
so-called Folk Theorem, underpin a new approach to the detection of tacit 
collusion. Experts for the defense are likely to find strong arguments in 
what I am going to say and will force the antitrust authorities to rethink their 




























































































because it shows that many more or less collusive equilibria can result from 
repeated noncooperative play when deviations can be punished in a credible 
way, I find the theorem very useful from the point of view of competition 
enforcers. Indeed, it should make them understand that a) collusive 
outcomes are possible without there being anticompetitive conduct, b) to that 
extent, there may be no need for firms to even try to make secret 
agreements, whether written or oral, c) it may be a waste of time to look for 
evidence on attempts to collude or attempts to punish cheaters, and d) when 
the Folk Theorem is in operation, antitrust proceedings will have to 
concentrate more and more on assessments of market outcomes, that is, the 
more or less collusive or non-collusive nature of noncooperative equilibria. 
In one word, industry behaviour can no longer be understood as emerging 
from the one-shot game proposed by Stigler but has to be seen as emerging 
from a repeated game (Baker, 1993, p. 153).
This reasoning leads me to a stylised description of future antitrust 
proceedings in the following terms. On the one hand, the economic expert 
speaking for the defense (in a case where firms are accused of concerted 
practices) has to be able to argue (and will be paid exactly to this effect) that 
the observed prices, sales and profits are typical for a noncollusive 
equilibrium sustained in a noncooperative repeated game. In the absence of 
direct evidence of collusion (no written agreements were discovered, there 
are no tapes recording secret conversations), the antitrust authority, on the 
other hand, has to put forward (and to pay) an economic expert that 
contradicts the expert for the defense and is trying to show that the prices, 





























































































A natural starting point for these experts is to postulate the existence 
of demand and cost functions and to start talking about the parameters of 
these functions. This, then, raises the question to what extent these 
parameters are known and by whom. At this point, it seems to me that the 
economists working for the antitrust authority are in a more difficult 
position than the economists working for the defense. They are at an 
informational disadvantage, for the simple reason that they have to get the 
relevant numbers from the firms that are under attack.
Given this informational disadvantage - which I think is very real - I 
wish to argue that the defense can make proof of collusion very difficult, to 
the extent that it can make the collusive outcome of the game 
indistinguishable from the noncollusive one. I am referring here to joint 
work with Ronald Harstad. We call this immodestly our "indistinguishability 
theorem".
The simplest way to explain it is to do the following numerical 
exercise. Let there be a market with n competitors selling a homogeneous 
product. The antitrust authority knows that they all produce at the same 
marginal cost c and the numerical value of c, which was truthfully 
reported. The authority also knows that their market demand is linear and 
that its intercept shifts from season to season. However, the authority does 
not know the numerical value of these intercepts. But it observes the time 
path of the price per season, since this is reported in the specialised press. 
The problem is to figure out whether the observed price, ps, for season s, is 
the result of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium - in which case there is no 
collusion - or the result of, say, joint profit maximisation. I suppose joint 




























































































repeated game could have many other collusive outcomes with profits below 
the monopoly level.
In a Coumot-Nash equilibrium the price is
( 1)
where as is the unknown demand intercept for season s. With




, 14 + 3(10) 44
Ps = ------ :------
In a collusive outcome with joint profit maximisation, the price in 
season s is
or, using the same parameter values,
Suppose that the observed price is actually 12, and that these 3 firms were 
tacitly colluding. What should the economic expert for the defense do? He 
or she should convince the authority that 12 is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
price. That is easy enough. Put (1) equal to (2) and solve for as, the false 
intercept to report:
u  14 + 10 24
P s  -  ~~ ~  ~
as +nc _ a s +c 





























































































a, =^[aI(n + l ) -c (n - l) ]
= i[14(4) -10(2)] = |( 5 6  -  20) = 18.
Overemphasising the level of market demand does the trick: pretend that as 
is 18 rather than 14. Indeed, using as = 18 in the Coumot-Nash solution (1) 
gives
18 + 3(10) 48
4 “  4 “
The observed price appears as competitive. In this sense, the two games 
cannot be distinguished.
Note that demand shocks, that is, changes in as, should be exaggerated 
also: always emphasise seasonalities! Needless to say, the same exercise can 
be done when the authority lacks information about other parameters, say 
marginal cost. Then the defense should exaggerate the level of costs but 
under-report cost changes.
The intuition behind the indistinguishability theorem should be clear. 
It goes back to Bentley MacLeod's remark in his 1985 European Economic 
Review paper on "conscious parallelism": as long as the profit functions are 
not known, there are no systematic differences between the size of price 
responses to exogenous shocks at the noncollusive and collusive equilibria. 
Clearly, this basic wisdom was ignored in the famous Wood Pulp decision. 
On 19 December 1984, the Commission decided that several North 
American, Finnish and Swedish producers who imported wood pulp into 
Europe (to be used by the paper industry) had to pay fines ranging between 
50,000 and 500,000 ECU, because they had announced and enforced parallel 




























































































decision and most of the fines for lack of proof. Indeed, the Commission 
had looked only for evidence of direct communication and used the absence 
of deviations from the parallel time path as evidence of collusion. Before 
the Court, the concept of a Coumot-Nash equilibrium was mentioned by the 
Advocate-General. But it was not used in the reasoning of the Court, nor 
was the concept of a repeated game. At any rate, I am very pleased with this 
judgement.
The indistinguishability theorem can also be illustrated in terms of 
price strategies instead of quantity strategies (see Bohnlein, 1994). Consider 
the ICI-Solvay decision of 1990. ICI was selling soda ash, a raw material 
used in the glass manufacturing industry, in the UK and Ireland. Solvay, the 
largest producer of soda ash, was selling in continental Europe. Several 
cartel agreements dating back to the last century had assigned continental 
Europe to Solvay while ICI had agreed to restrict its activity to the British 
Commonwealth. In 1972, the last of these explicit agreements was 
terminated. Yet, both firms continued to serve their former markets. 
During the eighties, UK prices rose by about 15 to 20 percent above those of 
continental Europe, more than the cost of shipping soda ash across the 
Channel. The Commission used the fact that neither ICI nor Solvay invaded 
each other's market during this decennium as proof of tacit collusion.
Again, the absence of market penetration can be rationalised as a 
feature of the noncollusive Nash equilibrium of a stage game in a repeated 
game. Suppose each producer sets a national limit price equal to the 
marginal cost of seriving customers in the home market plus shipping costs 
across the Channel: market penetration is not profitable. Then equate this 
competitive price with the monopoly price in each producer's national 




























































































Now the expert for the defense has three parameters with which to play in 
order to make the absence of market penetration appear as a competitive 
equilibrium. He or she should obviously exaggerate the intercept of the 
national demand curve or the level of the firm-specific production costs, as 
in the previous example with Cournot strategies. However, I recommend an 
exaggeration of the transportation costs, especially the shipping costs across 
the Channel, since these are subject to considerable economies of scale so that 
they depend on the market share that could be captured in the foreign 
market. Since both firms do not actually enter the foreign market, there is 
no available data on the entrant's potential market share.
Note that the expert for the prosecution was in a somewhat stronger 
position in the ICI-Solvay case than in the Wood Pulp case. He or she could 
have convincingly argued that the price gap between the UK and the 
Continent was collusive by proving that the two competitors had the same 
production costs, the same delivery costs and the same shipping costs over 
the Channel. Then the limit prices would have been the same in the two 
markets and any price difference would have been proof of collusion. An 
additional argument was to show that the intercepts of the market demand 
curves differed a lot while the costs did not since these intercepts show up in 
the monopoly prices only. To my knowledge, none of these questions were 
seriously discussed before the Commission reached its conclusion.
These two examples indicate that the indistinguishability I am talking 
about is not to be interpreted as a classic identification problem, as 
encountered in econometrics. The industrial economists among you know 
how identification can be obtained in the measurement of market power, as 
exemplified by the work of Bresnahan (1989). However, the problem there 




























































































problem is to distinguish two different equilibria. A correct econometric 
approach can be found in Margaret Slade's (1987) well known work on tacit 
collusion among gasoline stations in Vancouver. She was able to estimate 
demand, cost and reaction functions and thus to compare collusive and 
noncollusive outcomes of the stage game with the actual observed outcome of 
the repeated game. Note, however, that she benefited from most favourable 
circumstances, which are not likely to be present in an antitrust proceeding. 
First, a price war was actually going on, with price changes occurring often 
within a day, so that the data displayed an exceptional variability. Second, 
the variable cost of a gasoline station is simply the wholesale price of 
gasoline, which was also highly variable. Third, Slade was able to collect 
prices, costs and sales on the spot, day by day, until the price war stopped. 
Finally, the price war was typically an information-gathering device about 
the new level of demand after a demand shock had occurred. A comparable 
variability and reliability of the data is not likely to be available in antitrust 
proceedings.
It would therefore be nice if a simple test, involving a back-of-the- 
envelope calculation on indisputable data and based on a theoretically solid 
analysis, was available. I am glad to report that such a test can indeed be 
derived from the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting duopoly game with 
given capacities as formalised by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). The test 
itself is due to Osborne and Pitchik (1987). Let one duopolist have a larger 
capacity than the other and let these capacities be determined 
noncooperatively in a first stage. In a second stage of the game, the 
duopolists collude. (This is a case of so-called "semicollusion"). If the cost 
of capacity is below some limit, the collusive equilibrium implies excess 




























































































exceeds the total sales that yield the unconstrained monopoly profit. The 
duopolists plan their capacities in such a way that part of their capacities is 
not going to be used for production. In such an equilibrium, the profits are 
not proportional to the capacities, so that the profits per unit of capacity 
differ between the two competitors. In fact, Osborne and Pitchik show that 
a) it is the firm with the smaller capacity that makes the higher profit per 
unit of capacity and b) this profit increases relative to that of the large firm 
when their joint capacity increases relative to market demand. In the 
absence of collusion, however, the corresponding Kreps-Scheinkman 
equilibria imply unit profits that are the same.
In his recent paper on the great salt duopoly, Ray Rees (1993) tried to 
show that the two British producers of white salt replaced their explicit price 
agreement, that was discontinued in 1956 after the passing of the Restrictive 
Practices Act in the UK, by tacit collusion. He used a version of the Folk 
Theorem to show that none of the duopolists had an interest in deviating 
from parallel pricing, given a particular type of punishment.1 The 
immediate objection is that this is not really proof of collusion: if parallel 
pricing is an implication of a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, there is no 
incentive to deviate either. The Osborne-Pitchik detector, to the contrary, 
derives from a direct comparison between a collusive and a non-collusive 
Nash equilibrium. Throughout the period under investigation (1980-1984), 
both British Salt (BS) and ICI Weston Point (WP) had excess capacity. BS 
had a given capacity of 824 kilotonnes, WP had a given capacity of 1095
1 In the unpublished 1991 version of his paper, Rees postulates mutual 
minimaxing as in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). In the published 1993 





























































































kilotonnes. All I had to do was to divide the yearly profits by the capacities 
and to divide the sum of the capacities by total sales, to find the numbers 
given in Table 1.
Table 1: The Great Salt Duopoly
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
BS profit 7065 7622 10489 10150 10882
WP profit 7273 7527 6841 6297 6204
Bs profit per unit of capacity 8.6 9.3 12.7 12.3 13.2
WP profit per unit of capacity 6.6 6.9 6.3 5.8 5.7
industry capacity/total UK sales 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.9. 1.9
Not only was BS's profit per unit of capacity larger than WP's: it also 
increased relative to WP's as their joint capacity increased relative to market 
demand. None of these numbers is disputable (except for errors in my 
divisions). This test beats the indistinguishability theorem: I wish more such 
tests were available.
III. Enforcement of Article 86
I now turn to the enforcement of Article 86, which condemns abuses 
of a dominant position. Note that market dominance, or more generally 
market power as such, are not under attack. I wish to concentrate on the 
detection of one form of abuse, namely predatory pricing. Strangely 
enough, predatory pricing is not on the list of examples given by the Treaty 




























































































discrimination and tying) and was not part of the vocabulary of DG IV until 
the defense in the AKZO case argued that its client, AKZO, was not guilty of 
predation - something DG IV had never claimed it was guilty of!
We know, since the publication of Selten's Chainstore Paradox, in 
1978, how difficult it is to explain the occurrence of predation theoretically. 
We also know, since Isaac and Smith's (1985) experiment, how difficult it is 
to see it happen in the laboratory: we had to wait until the experiment by 
Jung, Kagel and Levin, published only last year, where incomplete 
information about the incumbent's type was introduced in a form that is 
compatible with the Kreps-Wilson (1982) model.
My concern, today, is with the detection of predation in practice. As 
with tacit collusion, I wish to argue that a good detector requires good game- 
theoretic modelling. My approach is to define predation as a pricing policy 
that turns a profitable entry opportunity for an entrant into an unprofitable 
one. To discover whether such an opportunity exists, that is, whether there 
is room for an additional firm in a market, it is necessary to find out 
whether the entrant would make a profit in a noncooperative post-entry Nash 
equilibrium. It is only if the entrant could have made profits that predation 
can be claimed. Typical for my approach is the focus on the entrant's 
profits, to check whether these could be positive in the circumstances under 
investigation. This seems to be a new idea, to the extent that the 
conventional approach in antitrust proceedings concentrates attention on 
whether the incumbent is pricing below cost. (Antitrust authorities are used 
to taking a close look at the incumbent's costs, not at the entrant's!). Once it 
is established that the entrant could have made profits in equilibrium, it 




























































































preyed upon and not from the entrant's mistakes or his aggressive behaviour 
in establishing leadership, that is, Stackelberg warfare.
To illustrate, let me first take the example of the "bus wars" in the 
U.K. In 1986, local bus services were deregulated, so that local bus 
operators were free to operate commercial services on any route in town, 
including routes served by municipally-owned public bus companies which 
operated traditional double-deckers. In many towns, private firms came in 
with frequent minibus services on the main routes through the city centres. 
The local incumbents reacted by reducing their fares and drastically 
increasing the bus-miles operated.
In Inverness, a town in the Scottish Highlands, an entrant started 8 
minibus routes in May 1988. In August it expanded with a further 7 minibus 
routes. In March 1989 it went bankrupt and was taken over. In September 
1991, the local incumbent, HSO (Highland Scottish Omnibuses) withdrew 
from the town. The U.K. Office of Fair Trading referred the case to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission on the grounds that the incumbent 
(HSO) had restricted the entrant's ability to compete, since it, the incumbent, 
had not earned enough revenue to cover total costs. The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1990, p. 1) agreed with this reasoning and concluded 
that HSO "went too far: its provision of new services and duplicates was 
grossly excessive, incurring losses that were unjustified....".
In an impressive paper published in 1993 in the Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. Dodgson, Katsoulacos and Newton made a careful 
analysis of the case and compared the actual losses of the incumbent and the 
entrant with their Nash equilibrium profits. The situation one month after 
entry is depicted in Figure 1. Point A represents the losses made by both 




























































































that there was room in the market for two firms. Figure 2 shows that the 
same was true a year later but that the Nash equilibrium had become more 
asymmetric. This is consistent with there being predation.
However, these losses were avoidable. Look at the reaction curves in 
Figure 3, where the numbers on the axes represent 10,000 bus-miles. The 
curves intersect at the point where the incumbent operates 25,000 bus-miles 
and the entrant 7,000 miles. In fact, they operated 72,000 and 48,000 bus- 
miles respectively, as shown by point A. This point lies above the line BB', 
at which the incumbent makes zero profit (n„, = 0). The entrant entered
with a level of output which was not only excessive but so high as to deny the 
incumbent the possibility of a profitable response. During subsequent 
periods, both firms continued to increase their bus-miles: this is clearly a 
case of Stackelberg warfare, both fighters trying to secure a leadership 
position in the future.
This fascinating episode has shown that a competitive battle can be 
(and is easily) misinterpreted as predation. The time has come to draw the 
lesson: a plaintiff (the entrant) in a case of alleged predation can easily make 
a fight by the incumbent price leader appear as predatory behaviour. 
Conversely, the defense (the incumbent) can make predatory prices appear as 
noncooperative Coumot-Nash outcomes that are not objectionable. Is this 
the Harstad-Phlips indistinguishability theorem again? Yes, it is.
In such a case of alleged predation, the incumbent is in the defense. So 
one possibility for the defense is to argue that the observed prices and 
quantities result from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the stage game rather 
than from predatory behaviour. To see what sort of advice to give, the 
expert for the defense could do the following exercise (see Normann, 1994). 
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Figure 1 : Actual and Nash equilibrium profits in Inverness one month
after entry
Key: n m: Incumbent's profit; ri£: Entrant's profit; A: Actual; E : Estimated 
Source: Dodgson et al. (1993, Figure 2).
Data









Fare (pence) 25.5 25.5 50.9 50.9
Bus-miles 72,000 48,000 25,000 7,000
Patronage 199,000 82,000 104,000 23,000
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Figure 2. -, Actual and Nash equilibrium profits in Inverness one year 
after entry
Key: r im: Incumbent's profit; ri,: Entrant's profit; A: Actual; E : Estimated 
Source: Dodgson et al. (1993, Figure 3).
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Bus-miles 102,000 72,000 38,000 10,000
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Figure 3 : Bus-miles reaction curves in Inverness one month after entry
Key: n m: Incumbent's profit; n^: Entrant’s profit; A: Actual;
B„. Incumbent's bus-miles; B'. Entrant's bus-milesm 7 e




























































































equilibrium. Then compute the first-order conditions describing predatory 
behaviour, on the assumption (for example) that a predator would sell a 
quantity such that the entrant makes at best zero profit. Equating the 
equilibrium quantities, it is clear that the incumbent can justify his larger 
sales and low prices by under-reporting its marginal cost or the level and 
slope of the market demand curve (which implies telling lies in a direction 
opposite to what the defense should do in the case of tacit collusion).
In real life cases, the situation is more subtle, however. As we saw in 
the Inverness bus war, it is often the entrant that engages in warfare to make 
the incumbent withdraw from its leadership position. In my opinion, this 
also happened in the famous AKZO case. In December 1985, the 
Commission imposed a fine of 10 million ECU on the Dutch chemical 
concern AKZO Chemie for abuse of its dominant position in the local UK 
market for flour additives sold to bakeries. Allegedly, AKZO had damaged 
the business of a small British producer called Engineering and Chemical 
Supplies Ltd. (ECS) by starting a price war in the UK market for flour 
additives, to punish ECS for entering both the UK and the German market 
for plastics. The situation is typical for predation: there is entry in one 
market and the entrant is punished in another market. Again, game theory 
tells us which questions should have been asked and which answers given.
First, the Commission used as evidence the fact that the managers of 
AKZO had formulated threats that, unless ECS withdrew from the plastics 
market, retaliation from AKZO would follow in the market for flour 
additives. One AKZO manager mentioned not only overall price reductions 
but also selective price cuts aimed at particular customers of ECS. The 
problem is whether such threats are credible, knowing that both firms had a 




























































































each other. During the proceedings, this question of credibility was not even 
raised.
Second, shortly after the threats had been formulated, AKZO made a 
binding commitment to eliminate predation from its action set, thus 
indicating that it was willing to collaborate. Since ECS had been a price 
follower for a decade, AKZO could expect ECS to continue to follow. Yet, 
when AKZO announced the usual price increase in the following year, ECS 
did not follow and made offers to AKZO's customers at the old price. The 
Commission did not interpret this as an attack. But when AKZO did 
counter-attack, in late 1980, that was interpreted as an abuse of a dominant 
position.
Third, when ECS argued that it had lost business, the Commission 
looked at AKZO's costs of production, not at those of ECS! AKZO appealed 
before the European Court of Justice, where the Advocate-General suggested 
that the Court should have a look at the entrant's cost of entry and cost of 
production. Amazingly, the Court decided, in 1991, that an analysis of 
ECS's cost structure is irrelevant. All it wanted to find out was whether 
AKZO had priced below cost.
Fourth, and last, suppose the Court had accepted to look into ECS's 
cost structure. What should its economic expert have done? The 
indistinguishability theorem suggests again that he or she should have urged 
ECS to overstate its costs of production as well as its cost of entry.
On the third day, Moses went up the mountain again: "there were 
thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of 
the trumpet exceedingly loud;...". When he came down, he was carrying the 




























































































and bring you the 10 commandments which summarise the advice I'd like to 
give the economic experts for the defense:
THE T E N  C O M M AN D M EN TS
1. Thou shalt have no other gods before competition
2. Thou shalt exaggerate the level o f  demand
3. Thou shalt exaggerate demand shocks
4. Thou shalt exaggerate the inelasticity o f  demand
5. Thou shalt exaggerate the level o f  costs
6. Thou shalt under-report cost shocks
7. Thou shalt exaggerate asymmetries between firms
8. Thou shalt exaggerate asymmetries between markets
9. Thou shalt exaggerate costs o f  transportation
10. Thou shalt otherwise tell the truth.
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